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Ideology and scientific credibility: environmental
policy in the American Pacific Northwest
Brent S. Steel, Denise Lach and Vijay A. Satyal
In the later years of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century,
there has been an increasing emphasis among many decision-makers, interest
groups, and citizens about the importance of science-based environmental
policy. The assumption is that scientists can facilitate the resolution of public
environmental decisions by providing scientific information to policymakers
and the public, and by becoming more directly involved in policy arenas than
they have traditionally been. However, at the same time, there are those who
question the value of science, especially for ideological reasons. This study
empirically examines the impact of ideology on attitudes toward science,
scientific research, and scientists among various environmental policy partici-
pants. The data utilized to investigate these orientations were collected from
surveys of five different groups involved in environmental policy and
management in the Pacific Northwest including ecological scientists at
universities and federal agencies; natural resource and environmental manag-
ers of state and federal programs; members of interest groups (e.g., environ-
mental groups, industry associations, etc.); the “attentive public” (i.e.,
citizens who have participated in the environmental policy process); and the
general public. Preliminary results reveal significant differences between
liberals and conservatives in their orientations toward science, with self-
identified liberals generally more likely to see science and scientists as
objective and conservatives having a contrary view.
1. Introduction 
Recently, the Union of Concerned Scientists issued the report Scientific Integrity in
Policymaking: An Investigation of the Bush Administration’s Misuse of Science, which
charges that “there is significant evidence that the scope and scale of the manipulation,
suppression, and misrepresentation of science by the Bush Administration are unprece-
dented” (2004: 2). Of particular concern in this report is the role conservative ideology plays
in the distortion of science. Many other observers, including social scientists, are also
concerned about the misuse of science by ideologues as well. Jones (2002) criticizes the use
of science for political goals and how bureaucracy often suppresses the dissemination of
important and relevant information to the public, while Blockstein (2002) has warned that
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science is no longer immune to political pressures and suggests rules for scientists to follow,
so that they are able to conduct their research independently and present findings without
pressure and fear.
In this paper, we study the influence of ideology on attitudes toward science among
ecological scientists, interest group representatives, natural resource managers, members of
the public who have been involved in natural resource and environmental policy processes
(which we will call the “attentive public”), and the general public. More specifically, we
examine the impact of subjective ideological orientations among these five groups on
attitudes toward the ability of scientists and the scientific method to produce unbiased and
useful information in the design of environmental and natural resource policy. Ideologies are
the set of ideals, principles, doctrines and myths that we have about how society is supposed
to work. As Dolbeare and Medcalf have stated, “An ideology simplifies, organizes,
evaluates, and gives meaning to what otherwise would be a very confusing world” (1993: 3).
Political ideologies are those ideals and preferences we hold about how to allocate power
and to what ends it should be used. Ideologies also serve “as guides to action” as well as
“the glue that holds social groups together” (Dolbeare and Medcalf, 1993: 5).
The study was conducted in the context of the Long Term Ecological Research Program
(LTER), a multi-site research effort that has been supported by the National Science
Foundation since 1980. Data were collected from surveys of five different groups involved
in environmental policy and management in the Pacific Northwest (primarily Oregon and
Washington): ecological scientists at universities and federal agencies; natural resource and
environmental managers of state and federal programs; members of interest groups (e.g.,
environmental groups, etc.); the “attentive public” (i.e., citizens who have participated in the
environmental policy process in the region); and the general public in Oregon and
Washington.
While this study concerns the American northwest, it has broader implications for
understanding the role of scientists in other environmental and natural resource policy
contexts with multiple stakeholders and participants. Many of the participants included in
this research project were directly involved in the federal government’s first major attempt at
large-scale ecosystem management involving scientists, social scientists and managers—
President Clinton’s Forest Ecosystem Management Team to manage late succession and old
growth forests in America’s west (FEMAT, 1993).
2. Ideology and science
As the scientific community has advanced our understanding of environmental issues and
problems over the past three decades, it has become an ever more important participant in
the policy process. When asked, many observers including scientists themselves, agree
with Harmon’s observation that, “We in modern society give tremendous prestige and
power to our official, publicly validated knowledge system, namely science. It is unique in
this position; none of the coexisting knowledge systems—not any system of philosophy or
theology, not philosophy or theology as a whole—is in a comparable position” (Harmon,
1998: 116; cited in Shabecoff, 2000: 139). As Sarewitz and Pielke have observed, “Policy
makers have called upon scientists to predict the occurrence, magnitude, and impacts of
natural and human induced environmental phenomena ranging from hurricanes and
earthquakes to global climate change and the behavior of hazardous waste materials”
(2000: 11).
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The importance of science and scientists is reflected by the National Academy of
Sciences, which was established by a Congressional charter in 1863 to “advise the federal
government on scientific and technical matters” (National Academy of Sciences Charter).
The Academy has been called on in recent years to research and to advise the government
on environmental issues such as global warming, nuclear waste management and disposal,
wildlife and fisheries management issues, and others.
While many scientists would agree that science is not value-free and that alternative
sources of information beyond those produced by the application of conventional science to
environmental problems can lead to the development of valid judgments about environ-
mental issues, most would agree with scientist Roger Levien (1979) that basic science and
applied scientific technology can play important and useful roles in the environmental policy
process. Levien argues that there are three principal ways that science and technology can
contribute to the effective management of environmental problems. First, scientists can help
provide citizens and decision-makers a “common understanding” of the key dimensions of
the environmental problem being addressed. Second, science can then “describe and invent
options for the solution” of the environmental problem. According to Levien, the third and
final way science can contribute in a major way to the resolution of environmental problems
is by estimating “the consequences of proposed solutions” (1979: 48).
The privileging of science underlies many of the statutory requirements that form the
basis of our environmental and natural resource management policies, including practices
such as regional planning, cost–benefit analyses of policies and programs, environmental
impact statement preparation, and risk assessments. These and other regulations, rules, and
practices bring social and environmental values to a decision-making system that epitomizes
rational and scientific problem-solving. Wildavsky further characterized the importance of
science and scientists in the policy process:
Scientific evidence does matter. I notice that no mention is made of witchcraft as a
rationale for regulation, but rather obeisance is made to science whether or not it is what
matters. Nor does any reasonable person get up and say that his ideology or her world
view requires inventing or denying dangers and to hell with the evidence. As long as
science is the only publicly acceptable rationale, it matters. (Wildavsky, 1995: 5; cited
in Alm, 1997–98: 256)
While there is strong support for the use of science in environmental and natural resource
policy among scientists, policymakers and citizens alike, the traditional scientific
approach—also called “normal science” by Thomas Kuhn (1970)—has come under increas-
ing scrutiny in recent years. Some observers have called this the “science wars” in the
Untied States (see Ross, 1996). The conventional model of science is seen by many as
inadequate for various reasons. The combination of the complexity of the problems faced
and the known limits of human measurement and analytical abilities come together to
constrain the power of science in this area of governmental responsibility.
The postmodern approach of uncovering and criticizing the epistemological and
ideological motivations of modern institutions has led to an alternative view of science.
Following Lyotard’s (1984) infamous definition of postmodernism as “incredulity toward
meta-narratives,” the acceptance of science as a process that results in authoritative and
objective “facts” is challenged by local and experiential knowledge created in context by
individuals with distinct ideologies. From this “post-normal” perspective, scientific data are
understood as only one source of information and authority among the many sources
involved in the policy process. Scientists, policymakers, and those affected by policy
typically work together to construct the meaning of the policy and the relevant science,
Steel et al.: Ideology and scientific credibility 483
commonly ignoring the boundaries and authority of science assumed by many scientists.
The value of scientific information can be considered to be entirely contingent on context,
and non-scientific, political, personal, and ideological information can readily override
scientific data in policymaking at many points (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992).
The emergence of this second understanding of the role of science in the policy process
has been described by Shabecoff (2000: 139): “In recent decades, science has begun to slip
from its lofty pedestal as it has become apparent that it is not adequate either to meet all the
needs of humanity or to protect us from the dangers that science and technology themselves
create.” This model posits that science and scientists are considered just one of many
sources of authority concerning natural resource management issues; that scientific informa-
tion may itself be biased; and that other types of policy actors, information, and values are
important in arriving at sensible public choices (e.g., Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; Ezrahi,
1980; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992; Ravetz, 1990).
Perhaps one of the most cynical critiques concerning science and the scientific method
emanates primarily from politicians, interest groups, and public policy advocates who are
politically conservative (Helvarg, 1994; Ross, 1996; Wilkinson, 1998). Paul and Anne
Erhlich have labeled this anti-science attack from the political right “brownlash,” a
sentiment reflecting the belief that most scientific research concerning the environment is
badly biased and inclined to overstate risks. According to Erhlich and Erhlich (1996), some
of the authors that are critical of environmental science as viewed from this perspective
include Gregg Easterbrook (1995), Stephen Budiansky (1995), Charles Mann and Mark
Plummer (1995), Ronald Bailey (1993), Ben Bolch and Harold Lyons (1993), and Bjorn
Lomborg’s The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World (1998),
although Lomborg may not agree with being labeled as being politically on the right.
The following passage from Bolch and Lyons exemplifies this critical perspective
toward environmental scientists (1993: 22–3):
The total environmental budgets of U.S. environmental advocacy groups alone are
estimated to exceed a quarter of a billion dollars. With that kind of power and money
at stake, no wonder new “threats” to mankind and the environment are discovered
almost daily . . . Scientists, especially academic scientists, are easily flattered with
cocktail parties and press conferences, and can be counted on for a steady stream of
new ideas. But even if no completely new problems are discovered, advancing
techniques of scientific measurement guarantee that smaller and smaller levels of
problem substances can be identified in an increasing number of things, such as polar
ice or mother’s milk.
As discussed in the introduction of this paper, some groups and observers, such as the Union
of Concerned Scientists, have suggested that the George W. Bush administration has
publicly promoted the use of science in environmental policies, yet in practice they ignore
scientific evidence that doesn’t support their conservative policy goals: they pressure
scientists to produce results that support the administration’s positions, and they use
distorted statistics or “fuzzy math” to underestimate the benefits of environmental regula-
tions and to overestimate the costs to industry (also see Devine, 2004).
Yet another critique of conventional science and scientists can be found among some on
the left, including some environmental activists. While modern environmentalism has
utilized and continues to make use of information supplied by science and scientists (e.g.,
Rachel Carson), there are those in the environmental movement who believe science is too
often used for purposes destructive to the environment (Porritt, 2000). This critique finds its
roots in the 1960s and 1970s when many people became concerned that the widespread use
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of some products of high technology—such as nuclear power, powerful pesticides and
fungicides, genetic engineering, etc.—may pose serious threats to public health and the
natural environment. A widely read example of this perspective is E.F. Schumacher’s book
Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (1973). The current debate about the
banning of genetically altered American foods and agricultural products by the European
Community serves as an example of environmentalists acting on their belief that scientific
research in this area can lead to much harm to the global ecosystem and to human health.
British activist Jonathon Porritt has written along these critical lines in Seeing Green: The
Politics of Ecology Explained (1985: 50). The following passage is telling in this regard:
There are those who would still have us believe that science itself is neutral, yet more
and more it is being put to ideological uses to support particular interests, especially
by those who already wield the power in our society. Science is simply not geared up
to cope with the priority problems of humanity. It is the already privileged sectors of
the developed economies that seem to get most of the benefits, spurred on by those
whose interests can hardly be described as neutral. These “technocrats” have ensured
that the principal measure of civilization should be technological progress rather than
wisdom . . .
What these different orientations toward science suggest is that, like all cultural phenomena,
science is likely to be influenced by ideology, especially when it relates to environmental
issues (Dunlap et al., 2001; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1996; Pierce et al., 1992; Ross, 1996). The
main focus of this paper is to empirically investigate how ideological orientations influence
attitudes toward science. For the purposes of this and earlier studies, we arrayed political
ideologies on a continuum ranging from left or liberal to right or conservative. In general,
those leaning to the left have ideals promoting liberty (individual freedom), equality
(meritocracy), and fraternity (sense of common good) in the famous claim of the French
Revolution. Those leaning to the right tend to have ideals elevating authority (order),
hierarchy (organization), and property (private ownership) (Dolbeare and Medcalf, 1993).
Without providing definitions, we ask respondents to identify where on this ideological
continuum they consider themselves to be located. This method for self-assessment of
political ideology has been used in multiple studies (e.g., Dunlap et al., 2001; Fleishman,
1986; Knight, 1993; Pierce et al., 1992). However, if used in another political system with
more variation in ideological orientations when compared to the United States (e.g.,
presence of a viable socialist party), then different response patterns could be used (i.e.,
“very left” and “very right” as in the World Values Survey, European Value Surveys, and
Eurobarometers).
Previous research revealed significant differences among scientists, natural resource
managers, and the public about what constitutes science and the most suitable role for
ecological science and scientists in the policy process (Lach et al., 2003; Steel et al., 2004).
Interestingly, scientists were the most skeptical group about the objectivity of scientific
research and about their ability to provide scientific answers to important environmental
policy questions. They were also hesitant about engaging in the policy process. The public
was found to be the most optimistic concerning the objectivity of science and the ability of
scientists to effectively participate in the policy process. However, this research did not
examine the impact of political ideology on attitudes toward science. Therefore, using data
collected in the American northwest, we will examine the impact of ideology on orientations
toward science and scientists among various policy actors.
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3. Research location
This study examines the role of science and scientists in the context of the Long Term
Ecological Research Program (LTER), a multi-site research effort that has been supported
by the National Science Foundation (NSF) since 1980. Ecological scientists at LTER sites
around the country, Antarctica, and Puerto Rico are producing basic ecological knowledge
that is changing the way scientists and lay people view the natural world (Luoma, 1999).
They are also increasingly expected to participate with non-scientists in efforts to develop
and even implement (sustainable) natural resource policies.
We were particularly interested in LTER scientists and research for several reasons.
First, scientists working at LTER sites are conducting a variety of basic research projects
that are funded by the NSF at least in part because they meet the criteria of “social
relevance.” Second, scientists at LTER sites represent a wide range of research organiza-
tions including colleges and universities, private research laboratories, and federal and state
agencies. At the same time, LTER participants also represent a wide range of investigative
and policy involvement from early-career scientists, managers, and public participants to
“old hands” who have lived through shifts in natural resource policy, public attention, and
public values. Finally, some LTER scientists collaborate with natural resource managers and
the public in resource decisions and provide input to policymakers at local, state, and
national levels. For example, scientists from the H.J. Andrews LTER site located in Blue
River, Oregon, in the Oregon Cascade Mountains, participated directly in developing
President Clinton’s Northwest Forest Plan (FEMAT, 1993), and are currently active in the
Cascade Center for Ecosystem Management, a federal government funded research program
that involves cooperation between research scientists, forest managers, local environmental
and industry groups, and public activists. Scientists at the H.J. Andrews LTER site have
been involved in research for over 50 years, and the data and theories generated by these
LTER scientists are applicable to other research locations—in both the national and
international context.
4. Methods
In late 1999 and early 2000 (and mid 2000 for the general public survey), survey data were
collected from random samples of different groups involved in environmental and natural
resource management in the Pacific Northwest (primarily Oregon and Washington): natural
resource scientists at universities and federal agencies (LTER scientists), managers of state
and federal agencies (e.g., US Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, Oregon
Department of Forestry, etc.), members of natural resource organizations who have
participated in public hearings and scoping activities concerning the management of public
lands (e.g., environmental groups, industry associations), the “attentive public” (those
having participated in a public hearing, providing a comment on proposed plans, or in some
other way identifying themselves as aware of and participating in the decision processes of
natural resource decision-making), and the general public in Oregon and Washington. Mail
surveys were designed on the basis of 50 face-to-face interviews of representatives of each
of the first four groups and responses to a pre-survey of government/university scientists.
The general public version of the survey was conducted in June and July 2000 with a
random sample of Oregon and Washington households. Three waves of mail surveys were
sent along with a fourth telephone or e-mail reminder if necessary. Sample sizes and
response rates are as in Table 1.
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As with all surveys, question wording, refusals, and other implementation difficulties
can result in error or bias. However, use of mail surveys in this project provides respondents
time to read and reflect upon the intent and wording of each question before responding. Site
and context specificity such as overall awareness of environmental issues, recent high
visibility events related to natural resources (either natural or social), and the general
sociopolitical context may also limit the scope for generalized inferences.
5. Findings and discussion
The first step in these analyses is to determine the general subjective ideological orientation
of the various groups included in this study. As we discussed previously, we used a seven
point scale with the following question and response categories: “On domestic policy issues,
would you consider yourself to be . . .” 1 = very liberal to 7 = very conservative, with 4 =
moderate. Mean scores for the five groups, reported in Table 2, are significantly different
(F-test significant at .000). Scientists are the group most likely to identify themselves as
liberal with a mean score of 2.84, while the mean for the general public is the most
conservative at 4.36—slightly to the right of moderate. Mean scores for managers were
slightly left of center at 3.56, while the mean score for the attentive public was close to
moderate at 4.04.
In order to determine orientations toward science and scientists, each respondent was
asked their level of agreement or disagreement with a series of statements, which underlie or
criticize many of the assumptions implicit in positivism, broadly construed. The introduction
provided to the statements was as follows: “In recent years there has been increasing debate
about what makes for reliable scientific findings that can be used with confidence to make
important decisions. Please take a moment to let us know how you characterize science and
the scientific process by indicating your level of agreement or disagreement with the
Table 1. Sample sizes and response rates
Sample Sample size Surveys returned Response rate
Scientist 189 155 82%
Manager 216 167 77%
Interest group representatives 198 119 60%
Attentive public 255 198 77%
General public 1,861 973 52%
Table 2. Subjective ideological orientation of scientists, managers, NGO representa-
tives, the attentive public, and the general public
Question: On domestic policy issues, would you consider yourself to be: 1 = very
liberal, 2 = liberal, 3 = slightly liberal, 4 = moderate, 5 = slightly conservative,
6 = conservative, 7 = very conservative
Mean (s.d.)
Scientists 2.84 (1.17) n = 153
Managers 3.56 (1.12) n = 164
NGO representatives 3.20 (1.41) n = 115
Attentive public 4.04 (1.48) n = 189
General public 4.36 (1.53) n = 968
F-test = 36.97, df = 4, p = .000.
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following statements.” The five statements concerning science that were included in all five
surveys were developed on the basis of interviews and an exploratory survey with various
government and university research scientists, philosophers of science, and social scientists
(Thurstone scaling technique). In the exploratory survey, more than 50 university and
government ecological scientists were provided with over 40 statements designed to
represent or question positivistic perspectives of science. These 40 statements were drawn
directly from the positivist Karl Popper’s work The Poverty of Historicism (1961) and
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (1972). Those statements that were
uniformly identified as “positivist” in the exploratory study were included in the surveys
utilized in this study. However, we only included five of these statements in the general
public survey owing to space limitations.
Table 3 reports mean scores for these five statements controlling for ideological
orientation. As discussed above, both observers on the left and right have had issues with
science and the notion of positivism. For this analysis, we collapsed responses for the
ideology scale into “liberal,” “moderate,” and “conservative” categories. Responses to the
ideology scale were recoded as follows: “very liberal” and “liberal” = liberal; “very
conservative” and “conservative” = conservative; and “slightly liberal,” “moderate” and
“slightly conservative” = moderate. We also tried collapsing responses by including
“slightly liberal” with liberal and “slightly conservative” with conservative responses, but
found that those respondents indicating they were “slightly” left or right of center did not
significantly differ from moderates. Therefore, we classified these respondents as moderate
in Table 3.
Because the focus of this paper is the impact of ideology on orientations of science, we
examined difference in means within each of the five groups in Table 3; however, we will
also examine the differences between groups in the forthcoming multivariate analyses. For
the first statement in the table (“scientists are generally more objective than others involved
in natural resource management decisions”), we find that there are no statistically significant
differences between ideological groups for scientists, managers, and non-governmental
organization (NGO) representatives. However, liberal members of the attentive and general
publics are significantly more likely to agree with the statement than conservative respon-
dents. A similar pattern was found for the closely related second statement (“science
provides objective knowledge about the world”), with liberals in the attentive and general
publics more likely to agree with the statement than their conservative counterparts. This
same pattern also was found for NGO representatives; however, there are no significant
differences between ideological groups among scientists and managers.
For the third statement included in the table (“nonscientists can make valid judgments
about the same phenomena studied by scientists using different forms of rationality”), we
find that conservative NGO representatives, and conservative attentive and general members
of the public are significantly more likely to agree with this statement than their self-
identified liberal counterparts. However, once again we find no ideological difference among
scientists and managers.
For the fourth statement suggesting that “scientific methods are inherently biased to
support existing social power structures” (a charge that postmodern observers would
support), we find statistically significant results for only two groups—NGO representatives
and the attentive public. Liberals are slightly more likely to agree with this statement than
conservatives. Ironically, for the final statement included in the table, which is somewhat
similar to the fourth statement (“scientific findings are often biased by interpretations
acceptable to the funding source”), conservative NGO representatives and members of the
attentive public were significantly more likely than liberals to agree with this statement.
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Conservative scientists and members of the general public were also more likely than their
liberal counterparts to agree with this statement.
In general, we find that there are significant differences in attitudes about science within
ideology groups. Members of NGOs, and the attentive and general public express more
differences than scientists and managers among their ideological groups; those who describe
themselves as liberal are more likely than those who describe themselves as conservative to
agree that scientists are generally more objective than others involved in decision-making
and that the scientific enterprise is itself biased to support the status quo. Conservative
Table 3. Subjective ideological orientation and attitudes toward science and scientists
Subjective ideological orientationa
Liberal
mean
Moderate
Mean
Conservative
Mean
A. Scientists are generally more objective than others involved in natural resource manage-
ment decisionsb
Scientistsc,d 2.54 2.36 2.25
Managers 2.33 2.19 2.22
NGOs 3.14 2.92 3.00
Attentive public** 3.48 2.81 2.48
General public** 3.93 3.79 2.68
B. Science provides objective knowledge about the world
Scientists 2.75 2.80 2.75
Managers 3.23 3.35 3.34
NGOs*** 4.00 3.52 3.12
Attentive public*** 3.82 3.73 3.13
General public** 3.98 3.75 3.00
C. Nonscientists can make valid judgments about the same phenomena studied by scien-
tists using different forms of rationality (e.g., experience)
Scientists 2.19 2.23 2.30
Managers 2.53 2.54 2.67
NGOs*** 2.69 2.81 3.70
Attentive public*** 2.66 3.12 3.62
General public*** 2.78 3.03 3.83
D. Scientific methods are inherently biased to support existing social power structures
Scientists 3.76 3.79 3.75
Managers 3.63 3.58 3.55
NGOs* 4.02 3.51 3.40
Attentive public** 3.86 3.66 3.33
General public 3.44 3.50 3.42
E. Scientific findings are often biased by interpretations acceptable to the funding source
Scientists*** 3.24 3.45 4.50
Managers 3.60 3.62 3.65
NGOs* 3.52 3.81 3.90
Attentive public*** 2.72 3.24 3.50
General public*** 2.88 3.26 3.61
a Responses to the ideology scale were recoded as follows: “very liberal” and “liberal” =
liberal; “very conservative” and “conservative” = conservative; and “slightly liberal,”
“moderate” and “slightly conservative” = moderate.
b Response categories were: 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.
c Significance levels for F-tests: *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
d Sample sizes: scientists = 153, managers = 164, NGOs = 115, attentive public = 189,
general public = 968.
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members of these groups are also more likely than liberal members to believe that
nonscientists can make valid judgments without using scientific methods and that science
can be biased by the funding sources. This last belief is shared by conservative scientists,
which is the only significant difference among scientist and manager ideology groups.
The final analyses included in this study examine the effect of ideology on orientations
toward science and scientists controlling for various independent variables. We use
multivariate regression to examine the impact of ideology and other control variables on the
five statements included in Table 3. Several sociodemographic factors are utilized as control
variables including age in years, gender, and level of formal educational attainment.1 These
variables have been found to be related to environmental attitudes and behavior in previous
research, and we include them here so that we can control for their impact while examining
the independent effect of ideology (see Dunlap and Michelson, 2001; Gardner and Stern,
2002; Pierce et al., 1992). We also control for the five research groups included in the study.
For the series of dummy variables assessing each group, it is necessary to omit one dummy
variable for the unbiased estimation of the equation. In the results presented here, we omit
scientists.  However, we conducted additional analyses omitting other groups as well and
received consistent results. For ideology, we used the dummy variable created for Table 3.
The dummy variable representing moderates is the category omitted. We also conducted
additional analyses by omitting conservatives and liberals and found consistent results.
The models presented in Table 4 correspond to the five indicators (questions) displayed
in Table 3. For all five models presented in Table 4, the F-statistic is significant, indicating
that the specified structure statistically, constitutes an acceptable model. However, adjusted
R2 scores indicate that we are not  explaining a great deal of variation in the dependent
variable for each model (the range of adjusted R2 scores is .04 to .19).
When examining the five models presented in Table 4, we find that at least one of the
ideology dummy variables has a significant relationship in all but one model (Model D:
“scientific methods are inherently biased to support existing social power structures”). After
controlling for the various independent variables, we find the dummy variable for liberals is
significant in models A, B and C. Self-identified liberals among the five research groups are
significantly more likely than moderates and conservatives (we ran multiple models
including and omitting all ideology dummy variables) to agree with the statement “scientists
are generally more objective than others involved in natural resource management deci-
sions” (Model A) and to agree with the statement “science provides objective knowledge
about the world” (Model B). Liberals are also significantly more likely than moderates and
conservative to disagree with the statement “nonscientists can make valid judgments about
the same phenomena studied by scientists using different forms of rationality” (Model C).
Conservatives, on the other hand, are significantly less likely than liberals and
moderates to agree that science provides objective knowledge about the world (Model B)
and more likely to believe that nonscientists can also “make valid judgments about the same
phenomena studied by scientists using different forms of rationality” (Model C). Con-
servatives are also more likely than moderates and liberals to agree with the statement
“scientific findings are often biased by interpretations acceptable to the funding source”
(Model E). We originally expected liberals to be the most likely to agree with this statement
given our previous discussion where many observers on the left and postmodernists see
science as reinforcing the existing power structure.
These findings suggest that ideology does indeed play a role in how science and
scientists are perceived. Liberals see science and scientists as generally objective and do not
believe that nonscientists have the same ability to understand ecological research, while
conservatives are more suspicious of scientific objectivity and believe that nonscientists can
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make just as valid observations as scientists. The findings for conservatives support much of
the previously discussed literature and critiques of the conservative George W. Bush
administration’s orientation toward science and scientists. However, we must offer a caveat
at this time. The study was conducted in the Pacific Northwest, which has a history of
consistently left of center voting records (i.e., “blue” states) and progressive politics (Steel
and Lach, 2005) and therefore may not be representative of other regions. We do have
preliminary findings, however, from a national survey that suggest similar results to the ones
reported here for scientists (Lach et al., 2005). 
As for the other variables in the model, the sociodemographic control variables were for
the most part not related to attitudes toward science and scientists (with one exception—age
in Model B). Many of the dummy variables for the various groups included in the study
were significant. However, the purpose of this study was not to focus on group differences
but on the impact of ideology on attitudes toward science and scientists in general and
within studied groups. Findings in this paper and in previous research on the topic reveal
significant differences among scientists, natural resource managers, and the public in the
Pacific Northwest about what constitutes science and the most suitable role for ecological
science and scientists in the policy process (Lach et al., 2003; Steel et al., 2004).
Interestingly, scientists in general are the most skeptical group about the objectivity of
Table 4. Regression estimates for orientations toward science and scientists
Statements about sciencea
A
Scientists are
more
objective
B
Science
provides
objective
knowledge
C
Nonscientists
can make
valid
judgments
D
Methods
support
existing power
structures
E
Findings
biased by
funding
sources
Variables
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Age .009
(.006)
.015***
(.005)
–.014
(.006)
.001
(.006)
–.009
(.007)
Gender –.161
(.125)
–.111
(.101)
–.075
(.117)
.084
(.119)
.112
(.129)
Education .060
(.160)
–.052
(.149)
.043
(.156)
.029
(.157)
.125
(.163)
Liberal .232*
(.101)
.616***
(.100)
–.287*
(.115)
.055
(.117)
–.115
(.115)
Conservative –.107
(.115)
–.343**
(.130)
.728***
(.165)
–.170
(.168)
.614***
(.190)
Managers –.169
(.129)
–.136
(.115)
.524***
(.112)
.207
(.110)
.188
(.111)
Interest groups .215
(.146)
.302**
(.118)
.802***
(.138)
.324*
(.122)
.169
(.149)
Atten. public .614***
(.178)
.573***
(.124)
.597***
(.139)
.302*
(.138)
–.461
(.132)
Gen. public .587***
(.119)
.623***
(.117)
.621***
(.119)
.122
(.122)
–.342*
(.118)
F-test 8.456*** 10.934*** 11.826*** 5.223* 6.351*
Adj. R2 .10 .18 .19 .04 .06
N 1,589 1,590 1,589 1,591 1,590
Significance levels: *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
a See Table 3.
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scientific research and about their ability to provide scientific answers to important
environmental policy questions. The attentive public was found to be the most optimistic
concerning the objectivity of science. However, the extent to which these patterns hold
outside of the American Pacific Northwest remains in question.
6. Conclusion
A former Regional Director of the National Marine Fisheries Service, Will Stelle, has
commented that “most people practice pick-and-choose . . . agenda-driven science in which
the quality of the science is judged by the apparent results achieved. This is not biological
science but political science” (cited in Blumm, 2002: 327). As we began this paper, the
Union of Concerned Scientists has charged the George W. Bush administration with just
such an approach to environmental management. And, as we found in the analyses presented
here, ideology does appear to affect how our sampled environmental policy participants in
the Pacific Northwest perceive the role of science and scientists in natural resource policy.
The implication of these findings for the use of science in the environmental policy
process suggests continuing partisan polarization, at least among some ideologues. While
moderates and liberals were generally more supportive of science and scientists, many on
the right remain skeptical and strongly support the use of nonscientists in the process as
well. One variable for which we did not collect data and that appears to be connected to
political ideology and therefore attitudes toward science, is that of religion. One of the major
programs of fundamentalist religions in the United States has been increased involvement in
politics and political decision-making (e.g., Norris et al., 2004; Berger, 1999). The injection
of religious values into science policy issues such as stem cell research reflects the
postmodern explanation that organizing institutions such as science are likely to be
challenged by local knowledge, non-rational decision criteria, and sub-cultural preferences.
This suggests that the findings reported here about the influence of ideology on attitudes
toward environmental science may also hold true in other policy arenas such as energy,
transportation, and climate change where technical and scientific information often play
critical roles in framing problems and solutions.
While scientists are expressing shock at the most recent examples of political manipula-
tion of science, social scientists and others have been observing the politicization of science
for decades (e.g., Primack and von Hippel, 1974; Dickson, 1984; Beck, 1992). Scientists
accused President Nixon, for example, of implying that his scientific advisors supported a
research program about supersonic transport (SST) when in fact many had grave concerns
that the planes would damage the ozone layer and contribute to climate change. Robert
McNamara, Secretary of Defense for Lyndon Johnson, also misrepresented scientific
information about anti-ballistic missiles. As described by Dickson, this was a situation “that
left many scientists disenchanted with the role they were being placed in as advisers to the
executive branch” (1984: 225).
Collingridge and Reeve (1986), however, note a tendency for institutional science and
individual scientists to adapt to changing political whims, securing funding by reconfiguring
research programs, questions, and methods. As Beck (1992) noted, one of the trade-offs for
this “politicization of science” was the “scientization of policy.” Since World War II,
institutional science in the developed world has itself been involved in the control of
research agendas, funding strategies, and distribution of findings. Findings that emerge from
these research agendas have been used to rationalize policy and practices that strove to
eliminate any “subjective” knowledge—that is, the values, experience, and local knowledge
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of the individuals affected by decisions and policies. Stakeholders, most of whom like the
respondents in this study have a strong respect for the practice of science, have been the odd
men out in this troika of science, politics, and bureaucracy—forced to engage with policy-
and decision-makers on quasi-scientific terms on the issues that personally affect their
health, livelihoods, and quality of life.
The promotion of “public interest science” in the early 1970s by liberal individuals and
groups, directly challenged the increasingly privileged role of science in addressing social
and environmental impacts (Primack and von Hippel, 1974). Even though Congress
authorized and appropriated funds for the “Science for Citizens” program in 1976, there was
little enthusiasm for the idea at the National Science Foundation or among many in the
mainstream scientific community who “objected to its activist tone” (Dickson, 1984: 230).
The program faded away quietly by the end of the decade. A twenty-first century resurgence
of “public interest science” may reflect conservative individuals and groups who are
increasingly convinced that their values about the impact of scientific advances such as
cloning, genetic modification, and quantum physics are being left out of the decisions.
We believe that scientists need to work with and engage all groups and citizens and
particularly those on the right to build the overall level of trust in both science and science-
based policy. While almost all scientists and most nonscientists believe that scientists should
not make policy, there is an emerging preference for an “integrative” approach to science.
This “post-normal science” calls for personal involvement by individual research scientists
in bureaucratic and public decision-making, providing expertise and promoting specific
strategies that they believe are supported by the available scientific knowledge (Ravetz,
1987; Steel and Weber, 2001). Others, such as Kai Lee, have similarly called for a new
“civic science” to integrate science and scientists in the policy process (Lee, 1993). While
these approaches may put scientists into very uncomfortable situations outside of the
laboratory and into the political realm, they will serve to both familiarize nonscientists with
the strengths and limitations of science in policymaking and scientists with the “sausage-
making” of policy.
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